扇形搜索下反舰导弹末制导雷达检测性能分析*

反舰导弹末制导雷达在进行自动跟踪前,首先要在方位向和距离向上对目标搜索并进行检测。末制导雷达的检测性能与脉冲积累数目、信杂比和搜索方式密切相关。针对反舰导弹末制导雷达常用的扇形搜索方式,提出一种二项式积累OS-CFAR检测算法。该方法在一个方位搜索周期内对距离向回波进行非相参积累。仿真分析表明,与常规OS-CFAR算法相比,该检测算法提高了末制导雷达的检测性能。     

美军数据链一体化建设及启示

通过总结美军数据链建设的现状与发展趋势,重点分析了美军数据链一体化建设中采取的基于数据转发、基于并行接口和基于消息标准多链路操作发展策略,并探讨了美军一体化建设过程中面临的问题。最后,结合数据链建设的实际情况,在汲取美军教训的基础上,提出了数据链一体化建设过程中应重点解决的问题。     

一种基于LMS的时域相干累积算法研究

为了克服低信噪比条件下传统的自适应滤波算法抑制高斯噪声效果差的缺点,提出了基于最小均方(LMS)的时域相干累积新算法。计算机仿真结果表明,该算法具有良好的抑制高斯噪声的性能,对于低信噪比下信号的增强效果明显优于传统的自适应滤波算法。     

存在自干扰码时的短周期伪码截获技术

针对伪码截获这一无线电侦察和导航战中的难题,从模式识别的角度研究存在自干扰码时的伪码截获问题。通过对干扰码的载波频率、相位等参数的估计和补偿,将自干扰码下的伪码截获问题转换为模式识别问题。结合伪码的周期性,采用二进制积累的方法大大降低了判决前所要求的信噪比,使得对扩频信号直接解调以截获伪码成为可能,改变了过去依靠大口径天线提高信噪比的方法。     

基于HLA的舰载多传感器信息融合系统仿真

建立具有舰载多传感器信息融合系统功能的C3I系统是目前和未来C3I系统的首要发展方向.应用HLA仿真技术进行舰载多传感器信息融合系统试验仿真,对于增强系统的通用性、灵活性、重用性和互操作性,实现复杂C3I系统集成具有重要的现实意义.首先提出了基于高层体系结构(HLA)的舰载信息融合系统的设计框架,其次阐述了系统设计思想和舰载多传感器信息融合仿真系统组成及功能,并针对作战想定背景进行了对象类和交互类的开发,最后给出了联邦仿真流程,实现功能模型和物理模型的建模.     

从大国博弈视角解读与应对第三次抵消战略

在常规军力优势相对衰落、经费预算日益缩紧的背景下,美军为维持其军事霸权,提出了旨在实现兵力全球自由投送的第三次抵消战略(Third Offset Strategy)。通过梳理抵消战略的现实背景、历史沿革和战略目的,我们发现如果把第三次抵消战略简单视作美军的军事技术发展战略甚至军事战略,就会陷入片面而幼稚的认识误区。除了防范潜在的技术诱骗和技术突袭,更应该从大国博弈的战略视角出发,全面审视和应对第三次抵消战略对我国的挑战。美军实现国家利益的需求导向、自我变革的决心勇气和创新能力、科技兴军的先进理念和以军为主的军民融合成功经验值得借鉴。要以我为主参与制定未来战争的"游戏规则",做到"你打你的,我打我的";要深入研究美军作战体系和美国国家战略的薄弱环节,有针对性地"攻其所必救",从而化解重大安全挑战,争得新的战略机遇期。     

加快推动国防科技和武器装备军民融合发展

国防科技和武器装备领域是军民融合发展的重点,也是衡量军民融合发展水平的重要标志。加快国防科技和武器装备军民融合发展,是保军强军的重要支撑,更关乎国家安全和发展一系列重大问题,必须从战略高度深刻领会其全局意义,以清醒头脑研判国防科技和武器装备军民融合发展形势,用务实举措推动国防科技和武器装备军民融合创新发展。     

坦克直瞄/间瞄射击一体化火控技术

直瞄射击方式是目前坦克采用的主要射击方式。直瞄射击方式受战场通视度及瞄准装置视距的影响,最大射击距离一般在5 km左右。间瞄射击方式不需要直接瞄准目标,不受战场通视度的影响,最大射击距离主要取决于火炮及弹药的性能,一般在10 km以上。未来坦克应具备直瞄射击与间瞄射击一体化能力。通过直瞄/间瞄射击火控技术的对比与分析,提出坦克直瞄/间瞄射击一体化火控方案。一体化火控具有新的技术特色,具有更强的综合作战能力,是未来坦克火控技术发展的一种趋势。     

Scheduling a production–distribution system to optimize the tradeoff between delivery tardiness and distribution cost

We consider a make‐to‐order production–distribution system with one supplier and one or more customers. A set of orders with due dates needs to be processed by the supplier and delivered to the customers upon completion. The supplier can process one order at a time without preemption. Each customer is at a distinct location and only orders from the same customer can be batched together for delivery. Each delivery shipment has a capacity limit and incurs a distribution cost. The problem is to find a joint schedule of order processing at the supplier and order delivery from the supplier to the customers that optimizes an objective function involving the maximum delivery tardiness and the total distribution cost. We first study the solvability of various cases of the problem by either providing an efficient algorithm or proving the intractability of the problem. We then develop a fast heuristic for the general problem. We show that the heuristic is asymptotically optimal as the number of orders goes to infinity. We also evaluate the performance of the heuristic computationally by using lower bounds obtained by a column generation approach. Our results indicate that the heuristic is capable of generating near optimal solutions quickly. Finally, we study the value of production–distribution integration by comparing our integrated approach with two sequential approaches where scheduling decisions for order processing are made first, followed by order delivery decisions, with no or only partial integration of the two decisions. We show that in many cases, the integrated approach performs significantly better than the sequential approaches. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Institutionalizing supreme command: explaining political–military integration in the Vietnam War, 1964–1968

Under what conditions can leaders achieve wartime political–military integration? In the Vietnam War, political–military integration exhibited dramatic variation: in the air war, the US was able to tightly integrate its political objectives and military conduct, but in the ground war, the American military prosecuted a strategy that was both divorced from broader political objectives and was immune from Washington's influence. I argue that the nature of information management between the military and civilian leadership explains the pattern of political–military integration in the Vietnam War more completely than do explanations that focus on the organizational cultures of professional militaries.